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Abstract This article analyzes how transaction costs influence the ability to
charge nonlinear prices and how market structure and industry behavior affect those
transaction costs. The failure to recognize that nonlinear pricing produces a different
equilibrium than linear pricing together with a recognition that the pricing
mechanism can be altered by conduct under antitrust review explains why the usual
antitrust analysis can be misleading. The paper illustrates its points using merger
simulations with nonlinear pricing. Finally, the paper analyzes how to identify
situations where market power might arise and applies the analysis to exclusive
dealing, credit cards and FRAND royalties.
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1 Introduction
Coase (1960) altered fundamentally how most economists think about externalities
and government intervention. Coase made the point that in a world with well-
defined property rights and no transaction costs, parties would always wind up at an
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efficient point, thereby eliminating externalities and the need for government
intervention.
But Coase’s main point was that we do not live in such a world and that by the
assignment of property rights, a government can influence transaction costs and
thereby the ability of the economy to reach an efficient point. Therefore, a
government should assign property rights in order to enable the economy to reach
an efficient solution.1
We explore in this article the implications of Coase’s insights for antitrust and
show how Coase’s insights mean that we should refocus much or at least some of
our economic analysis of the antitrust issues that are related to mergers and market
power. This article together with a companion paper (Carlton and Keating
forthcoming) makes several points that are related to transaction costs and antitrust.
In the absence of transaction costs, output would be at the efficient level, and
there would be no deadweight loss, and hence no need for antitrust if one uses a total
surplus criterion (Demsetz 1968). Since there are transaction costs, it is important
for an antitrust analysis to examine whether they are sufficiently low to enable
nonlinear pricing; and, if not, whether the conduct that is under scrutiny lowers
transaction costs so as to allow the use of nonlinear pricing. Failure to account for
the use of nonlinear pricing can lead to a mistaken antitrust analysis—especially
when efficiencies are involved.
Finally, the cost of creating a coalition of economic agents is related to
transaction costs. Cooperative game theory tells us that one can view all of antitrust
in a unified way as the creation of one coalition that exploits the non-coalition
members. By studying when coalition formation is low and high, one can identify
situations where the creation of market power is possible.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the foundational model of
antitrust in which a firm (or group of firms) maintains a uniform price that is above
marginal cost, restricts output (below the level that would be dictated by the
criterion of price equals marginal cost), and harms consumer and total welfare. For
example, the famous Williamson diagram (Williamson 1968) is still the way
mergers are often thought of—with the deadweight loss from the merger’s
consequence of raising the price offset in part or in total by the efficiency gain from
the lowered costs that are also the consequence of the merger.
But Coase’s insight forces us to focus on transaction costs in our analysis. What
prevents any firm with market power from eliminating the deadweight loss that is
typically associated with that market power? How does competition affect that
transaction cost, and how will that transaction cost be altered by a change in market
structure or by certain conduct such as the imposition of vertical restrictions?
Section 2 explores these questions and shows that only by answering them can we
1 Or, more precisely, the efficient solution is one that takes account of transaction costs and depends on
the efficient assignment of property rights. Stigler, only half-jokingly, described Coase’s article and in
particular his first result—the one involving no transaction costs—as 60 pages of Pareto-optimality said
very slowly. Stigler’s point is that since a bigger pie is always preferred to a smaller one, Coase’s point is
obvious if one defines ‘‘no transaction costs’’ to mean that one obtains efficiency. [Stigler would be the
first to admit that Coase’s point was not, at least initially, obvious to anyone; see Stigler (2003).]
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hope to understand the antitrust implications of a merger or of specific conduct that
comes under antitrust scrutiny.
To illustrate the importance of transaction costs in an antitrust analysis, Sect. 3
summarizes some merger simulations from Carlton and Keating (forthcoming),
where a merger simulation with nonlinear pricing is developed and where the results
show that the usual merger simulation with uniform pricing can yield misleading
results. Finally, Sect. 4 describes how all of antitrust, including both horizontal and
vertical behavior, can be thought of as the creation of one coalition that exploits the
non-members of the coalition. By focusing on the transaction costs of creating
various coalitions, one can identify when antitrust violations are most likely to
occur. We illustrate these ideas by applying them to exclusive dealing, credit card
firms, and the setting of royalties in standard-setting associations.
2 Coase, Transaction Costs, and Deadweight Loss
As explained in the Introduction, Coase’s insight is that there is no deadweight loss
in the absence of transaction costs. If there is to be a concern about the inefficiency
that is created by market power, it must be true that transaction costs exist to impede
achievement of efficiency. (Of course, even if total surplus is maximized, consumer
surplus can be lowered by the use of market power. All of our results apply even
when the objective is to maximize consumer surplus.) By transaction costs, we
mean those costs that provide the information to a firm on how to price as well as
those costs that a firm must incur to prevent arbitrage among consumers to whom
the firm is charging different prices. In this section, we describe several examples
where either the industry practices or market structure affects these transaction
costs.
Although we hope these examples (and those in our companion paper) are
persuasive to the skeptical reader, we note that the point about market structure’s
influencing the ability to engage in non-uniform pricing is actually an old one in
industrial organization. The classic example is the vertical integration of Alcoa
before the 1940s. Alcoa vertically integrated forward into the high-elasticity end
products that used aluminum ingot, and thereby attained the ability to prevent
arbitrage. This enabled Alcoa effectively to practice price discrimination between
the producers of the low- and high- elasticity end products. This example is often
used to explain Alcoa’s decisions to integrate vertically into certain end products
(and not others) that used aluminum ingots—the product that was assumed to be
monopolized by Alcoa—as an input (see Carlton and Perloff 2004).
The required effort and cost to engage in nonlinear pricing may well depend on
firm conduct and industry market structure. Hence, firm conduct or market structure
(or changes in them) can affect the relevant transaction costs. Let us illustrate this
last point with several examples, each of which is interesting in its own right since
each is related to many situations that arise routinely in antitrust. Each of the
examples shows that the ability to practice nonlinear pricing can be influenced by
conduct that often raises antitrust scrutiny.
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2.1 Firm Conduct–Loyalty Discounts
Suppose a dominant firm institutes a policy of granting loyalty discounts as long as a
customer buys 80 % of its aggregate purchases of that category of inputs from the
firm. This can clearly be a way for a firm to gain information about the total demand
of the customer—information that the firm might otherwise have a hard time
figuring out. Armed with this information, the firm could figure out how this
customer’s demand varies over the business cycle and could devise various types of
nonlinear (including discriminatory) pricing mechanisms. These mechanisms could
enable both the customer and the firm to be better off because, absent the
information, the customer might be faced with a linear price schedule that we know
is inefficient in the presence of market power to the extent that price exceeds
marginal cost.
Many times these pricing schemes are claimed to be exclusionary, and that might
well be so. But the fact that the schemes allow nonlinear pricing could be a benefit
that outweighs the exclusionary effects. Of course, if the exclusionary effect is
substantial so that the effect of the pricing scheme is to prevent what would
otherwise be competitive pricing, then we know that there is an antitrust harm.
2.2 Merger to Monopoly with Efficiencies
As another example, consider a merger to monopoly of two firms, where the merger
creates some productive efficiency. One standard analysis is to ask by how much the
price under monopoly will rise compared to the price under duopoly. The analyst
will attempt to determine whether the efficiency gain offsets the harm from the loss
of competition. But that analysis holds constant the pricing mechanism; it assumes
the use of uniform pricing both pre- and post-merger.
But why is that a good assumption? Following Coase, we know that the outcome
with uniform pricing can be improved upon from society’s viewpoint as long as the
transaction costs are not too high for such a pricing mechanism, and we know that
all parties can be made better off under such a mechanism. We also know that the
ability to price discriminate can be made more difficult by the presence of
competing firms. In the presence of a competing firm, any attempt to charge some
customers higher prices on average may be easy to undermine, as the customers that
pay the higher average prices turn to others that may be able to purchase and then
resell at lower prices—especially as resale may be facilitated by the competing firm.
Therefore, it may be possible to use more sophisticated pricing mechanisms post-
merger than uniform pricing because of the elimination of competition.
Suppose that it is possible to use two-part tariffs rather than uniform pricing post-
merger, because of the lowered transaction costs of engaging in non-uniform pricing.
Might that not be relevant to determining the desirability of the merger? We are
unaware of such merger simulations that involve nonlinear pricing in the existing
economics literature; but in the next section we summarize some results from the
recent development of such a model (see Carlton and Keating forthcoming).
The results show that this nonlinear pricing model can give very different
answers with regard to the desirability of a merger compared to our standard merger
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simulation, especially in the presence of production efficiencies. One reason is that
production efficiencies are most important when output is large. Since output is
likely greater with nonlinear pricing than with linear pricing, it follows that one
likely effect of a traditional analysis that assumes linear pricing is to underestimate
the efficiency gains from a merger when the merger will lead to production
efficiencies and also to a more sophisticated pricing mechanism. In essence, the
more sophisticated pricing can significantly alter the evaluation of the merger
compared to an analysis that assumes uniform pricing.
This example involved a horizontal merger. Similar principles apply to vertical
mergers. We give two examples: The first involves a common concern that is related
to vertical foreclosure, while the second involves a combination of vertical and
horizontal concerns.
2.3 Vertical Merger to Foreclose
Suppose that an input monopolist sells to several downstream firms that compete
amongst themselves. The monopolist buys one of the downstream firms. The other
downstream firms complain that the merged firm will have an incentive to foreclose
them from (or raise their costs for) the input in order to benefit the downstream
division of the vertically integrated firm. There are numerous models of such
foreclosure in the literature (see, e.g., Ordover et al. 1990). Most, if not all, of the
models that involve vertical foreclosure assume some inefficient pricing between
firms and then show, depending on the details of the assumptions (e.g., Cournot vs.
Bertrand), that the vertical integration can cause harm through foreclosure.
But the analyst should ask what merger-generated changes make foreclosure
more likely than it was pre-merger. If, pre-merger, the input monopolist could have
contracted with one ‘‘independent’’ downstream firm (e.g., the firm that it is
merging with), told the firm ‘‘hey, I will advantage you relative to your rivals, so
let’s share the profits,’’ then there would be no gain from the vertical integration.
Suppose that the market conditions pre-merger were such that there were a large
number of very detailed and complicated contracts that involved terms that defined
nonlinear pricing and exclusion of rivals. Then why should one assume that
exclusion would occur post-merger when it does not occur pre-merger when such
contracts appear feasible? The only reason would be that the transaction cost of the
exclusionary contract that I have just described becomes easier to carry out when
the firm is integrated. But why?
If that question cannot be answered, then the regulatory or antitrust authority
should be skeptical of the foreclosure argument.2 Indeed, one might think that, at
least sometimes, it is easier to get away with an exclusionary contract (which is hard
2 One example of this might be the vertical integration of a content provider into satellite distribution.
Other competitors to the satellite provider such as cable companies might complain about the possible
foreclosure of desirable program content. But then the relevant question is: Why is this foreclosure easier
post-merger than pre-merger, especially in an industry where exclusionary contracts are not unusual? See,
for example, the report of Carlton et al. (2003) that is related to News Corp’s acquisition of DirecTV
where Carlton appeared as an expert for News Corp., as well as the testimony of Carlton (2014) with
regard to the proposed merger of Comcast and Time Warner.
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to observe) compared to avoiding detection of the possibility of the exclusionary act
when there is the full scrutiny of a regulatory or antitrust agency that is evaluating a
vertical merger and can impose conditions to prevent exclusion. This is especially
possible if there is a regulatory body involved, such as the US Federal
Communications Commission (FCC), that operates under a different statutory
standard than, say, an antitrust authority.3
2.4 Horizontal Merger that Leads to Vertical Antitrust Concerns
As a final example that shows how the transaction costs of implementing a price
mechanism can change as a result of some antitrust act, consider a horizontal merger
that will have vertical implications. Suppose that there is a monopolist that sells to
many buyers. Because of either a lack of information or the difficulty in preventing
arbitrage, the monopolist can charge only a uniform monopoly price to the many
buyers.
Suppose now that several of the buyers merge to form one large firm. In that case,
it is easy to imagine a situation in which the large buyer can negotiate with the
monopolist while the many remaining small buyers cannot because it is too costly.
The large buyer may be able credibly to commit not to engage in arbitrage, succeed
in obtaining a lower marginal price than its constituent firms had previously paid,
and split the gains of its output expansion with the monopolist through some lump-
sum payment (i.e., nonlinear pricing is used for the largest buyer).4
The analysis of the consequences of the creation of a large buyer through merger
must take into account the changed pricing mechanism that results as a consequence
of the merger. The outcome could raise total surplus overall, lead to an expansion of
output, and could in principle lead to a harm to the small buyers. If for example, the
small buyers have a lower demand elasticity than the large buyer, the small buyers
could see their prices rise after the merger. It is problematic to require that a merger,
in order to pass antitrust scrutiny, must make each buyer better off (or no worse off),
and we would settle for a total surplus (or total consumer surplus) approach, though
others may differ.5
There is an interesting antitrust wrinkle in this last example: Suppose that the
buyers are not final consumers but instead purchase an input from the monopolist
and then compete with each other in an output market. Then the higher marginal
input price to the small buyers obviously could enhance the market power that the
large buyer has in the output market. If the presence of small firms in that output
market prevents the large buyer from pricing efficiently (price discriminating) to its
3 The US antitrust authorities can act to prevent a harm to competition. The FCC can act if their action is
‘‘in the public interest.’’
4 Once some of the gains from the merger are split between the merging firm and its largest buyer, it
becomes unclear what possible theoretical justification there is for focusing on consumer surplus rather
than total surplus in formulating antitrust policy.
5 We note that almost every merger likely makes some consumers worse off. Think of an airline merger
where post-merger the firm moves a plane from a low demand route to a high demand route. The
consumers on the low demand route may be harmed. Yet, we suspect that the Department of Justice
would not block such a merger solely for that reason.
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customers, then the elimination of the small input buyers through high input prices
could lead to even higher profits for our large buyer than would otherwise occur
from just the elimination of its competition because the large buyer also becomes
better able to price discriminate. If so, then the large buyer and the input monopolist
can coordinate and destroy the small buyers, leading to a price-discriminating
monopoly in the output market. Then those monopoly profits in the output market
can be split (with some attendant transaction cost, no doubt) between the now two
monopolists—the input- and output-monopolists.6
Notice that even if all input buyers—small and large—could coordinate and
bargain efficiently with the input monopolist to obtain marginal cost pricing, the
large buyer would refuse because he can make more money by striking a bargain
with the input monopolist to drive out the small input buyers. Suppose that we
consider the gain to the large buyer from having the monopolist charge a high price
to its rivals (the small buyers). Part of that gain comes from the fact that the
advantaged large buyer will be able to exercise monopoly power over its consumers
in a way not possible before.7 By eliminating the competitive constraints on the
pricing mechanism in the large buyer’s market, the input monopolist can cause the
large buyer’s profits to increase with the result that the input monopolist can capture
some of that extra profit for itself.
Of course, we would need to investigate why there is market power in that output
market, whether the market power creates deadweight loss, what coalitions can
form, and how costly it is for them to form; but it is easy to see that the best way for
our input monopolist to exploit his market power could be to skew competition in
downstream markets, favor the large buyer, enable the large buyer to price
discriminate (through the weakening of the competitive constraints on output
pricing by the small buyers), and share in some of the increased downstream
profits.8 Whether this is the best way to exploit his power will again depend on all
the relative transaction costs of dealing with the various coalitions.
The key point is that a central issue in many antitrust matters is how the
conduct under antitrust scrutiny alters the ability to exploit the existing and/or
newly-created market power. We rarely, if ever, think of things that way. We
should, but do not, pay attention to how the various transaction costs of
organizing groups both horizontally and vertically may change as a result of a
changed market structure.
6 This example does not violate the ‘‘one monopoly profit’’ theorem. Instead, it illustrates that when there
is the ability of the input monopolist to create an output monopoly that can price discriminate, this will
lead to higher profits than if the output market is characterized by uniform pricing. One can view the
example as the creation by the input monopolist of the transaction technology to allow the output
monopolist to price discriminate.
7 Of course, those downstream consumers would, following Coase, want to eliminate the deadweight
loss, and could pay to undo this arrangement. To keep it simple, we will assume that such arrangements
engender such high transaction costs as to eliminate their feasibility.
8 This is a variant on a well-understood motive for a monopolist to integrate vertically downstream into
an otherwise competitive industry: The monopolist may be able profitably to practice downstream price
discrimination or other forms of nonlinear pricing in a way that the competitive firms could not.
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3 Merger Simulation with Nonlinear Pricing
The previous section described how certain industry practices or conduct (i.e.,
merger) could influence the ability of firms to practice nonlinear pricing. In this
section, we report on how the usual type of antitrust analysis in which one focuses
on uniform pricing before and after the merger can lead to erroneous conclusions.9
Carlton and Keating (forthcoming) develop and implement a merger simulation
model with nonlinear pricing. We report below the results of merger simulation with
and without nonlinear pricing (two-part tariffs) and with and without efficiencies.10
The simulations assume that there are two firms that pre-merger compete as
differentiated-product Bertrand rivals and post-merger behave as a two-product
monopoly. Demand curves are linear, consumers have heterogeneous tastes for each
of the firm’s products, and production is characterized by constant returns to scale.
There is also a constant cost to attract a consumer to a firm’s product.11 Each
consumer consumes only one of the two firm’s products after he compares the
surplus he gets from each of the firm’s two-part tariffs.
We report in Table 1 a summary of the results for a merger that involves no
efficiencies. There are several points to note about the results: First, the output is
always higher—as is total and consumer surplus—in any market structure when
two-part tariffs are used instead of uniform pricing. For example, post-merger,
consumer surplus rises from $0.72 to $0.97 when two-part tariffs are used instead of
uniform pricing.
Second, if the pricing mechanism does not change, then the merger harms
consumers and reduces total surplus. For example, in columns (1) and (2) total
surplus falls from $1.54 to $1.39 with uniform pricing and from $2.06 to $2.03 with
two-part tariffs.
Third, and perhaps most important, if the merger enables the firm to use two-part
pricing instead of uniform pricing, then the merger increases total (and consumer)
surplus. For example, total surplus rises from its pre-merger value of $1.54 with
uniform pricing to its post-merger value of $2.03 with two-part tariffs. That is, the
merger should be approved once one takes account of the efficiency that the merger
creates by enabling the use of a nonlinear pricing mechanism.
Table 2 summarizes the simulation results of Carlton and Keating (forthcoming)
when there are marginal cost efficiencies. The simulation assumes a very modest
efficiency of 3 % in the production costs of one product.
Table 2 makes two points: First, it shows that a merger that would be deemed
anticompetitive under uniform pricing becomes procompetitive if two-part tariffs
are used both pre- and post-merger. Specifically, under uniform pricing, consumer
surplus falls from $0.90 to $0.78, but with two-part tariffs the consumer surplus
rises from its pre-merger value of $1.00 to $1.04. The reason is that with the greater
9 Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) is a notable exception.
10 We fully understand that one could adopt more complicated pricing schemes than two-part tariffs—
indeed the logic of the previous section suggests that one should explain, not assume, why such
complicated schemes are not being used. But since our main point is to illustrate the implications of
altering the assumptions of uniform pricing, our approach suffices to make our point.
11 See Carlton and Keating (forthcoming) for details.
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output associated with the use of two-part tariffs (from Table 2, post-merger output
is 0.74 with uniform pricing versus 1.13 with the two-part tariff), the efficiencies
matter much more than under uniform pricing.
Second, to the extent that the merger also allows for the firm to adopt nonlinear
pricing instead of uniform pricing, then there is an additional merger benefit. The
combination of the two benefits—the production efficiency and the pricing
technology efficiency—reinforce one another.
Hence, an analysis that takes account of both sources of efficiencies can find
much larger benefits than an analysis that ignores those sources of efficiencies. For
example, in Table 1 we saw that with uniform pricing, the merger reduced
consumer surplus from $0.90 to $0.72; but with just a 3 % merger-induced
production efficiency that is combined with the merger-enabled ability to use a two-
part tariff, consumer surplus post-merger rises to $1.04.
This example illustrates that the usual merger analysis that assumes uniform
prices can be quite misleading in the presence of nonlinear pricing and efficiencies.
Indeed, the answer to the question of whether a merger will improve consumer or
society’s welfare can be wrong when one adopts the usual practice of ignoring the
existence of nonlinear pricing.
4 Transaction Costs and Coalitions
Virtually all models and analyses that we have seen that analyze anticompetitive
conduct make the implicit assumption that certain transaction costs are low and
certain ones are high. Most industrial organization economists make these
assumptions naturally when performing an antitrust analysis and likely do not
think about them much.
Table 1 Illustrative results with no efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uniform tariff Two-part tariff
Stand-alone Merged Stand-alone Merged
Output 0.79 0.71 1.10 1.09
Total consumer surplus $0.90 $0.72 $1.00 $0.97
Total surplus $1.54 $1.39 $2.06 $2.03
Table 2 Illustrative results with efficiencies
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Uniform tariff Two-part tariff
Stand-alone Merged Stand-alone Merged
Output 0.79 0.74 1.10 1.13
Total consumer surplus $0.90 $0.78 $1.00 $1.04
Total surplus $1.54 $1.50 $2.06 $2.20
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For example, imagine a situation where a large number of firms are competing.
Although it is well understood that those firms might well gain if they could
coordinate and behave as a cartel, the transaction costs of doing so might be so high
as to preclude that outcome, even in the absence of antitrust laws that prohibit such
behavior.
However, if there were to be a merger among many of these firms, then
presumably a common pricing authority within a firm could enable prices of the
formerly independent firms to be ‘‘coordinated’’ easily. That is the underlying
intuition for why merger policy is concerned about increased concentration that
leads to higher prices.
That concern is implicitly based on an underlying assumption regarding
transaction costs. That reasoning, of course, makes a lot of sense; but we would
like to recast what may appear obvious in order to highlight how the recasting can
help identify quite clearly certain circumstances when antitrust harms are most
likely to occur.
To be concrete, we will illustrate our point by examining three areas where it is
understood how certain actions can sometimes generate antitrust harm: vertical
restrictions on distributors with exclusive dealing; collective action by buyers that is
achieved through the formation of a firm, as is illustrated by credit card firms; and
standard-setting.
Let us begin by introducing some slightly cumbersome notation. Let m be a set
that consists of all of the manufacturers in the industry; let d be the set of all of the
distributors; and let c be the set of all of the consumers of the product. Let M be the
set that consists of all of the subsets of m, D be the set of all of the subsets of d, and
C be the set of all of the subsets of c.
We want the reader now to consider all possible coalitions of manufacturers,
distributors, and consumers (M, F, C)—that is, a grand set of coalitions that consist
of some manufacturers, some distributors, and some consumers. Each such coalition
has associated with it a transaction cost of organizing.
The theory of the core teaches us that under certain circumstances a competitive
(price-taking) equilibrium exists, is unique, and has the property that there is no
coalition that can form that can improve the well-being of its members.12 In the
typical exposition of the theory of the core, transaction costs are taken as zero.
We now want to introduce positive transaction costs to explain how an antitrust
harm can occur.13 We have already seen one standard instance in the example where
the transaction costs of coordinating price among many horizontal competitors are
high so that a merger could lower those transaction costs of coordinating, thereby
leading to elevated pricing. It makes sense in that setting to assume that each of the
many consumers might not find it worth their while to form coalitions to negotiate
with a firm with market power and return the equilibrium to an efficient point. Let us
see when else transaction costs can help identify an anticompetitive possibility.
12 See, e.g., Mas-Colell et al. (1995, p. 657). See also Telser (1987, 2006).
13 The notion that it is costly to form coalitions and that cost should be a focus of study figures
prominently in the literature on public choice and regulation (Olson 1965; Stigler 1971). Transaction
costs have received much less attention in understanding how a firm can form as an agent for its buyers or
how anticompetitive coalitions in general can form. Telser (1997) is a rare exception.
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4.1 Vertical Restrictions: The Case of Exclusive Dealing
In any model where vertical restrictions are used to create an anticompetitive harm,
it has to be the case that the participating distributors and manufacturing firm are
collectively better off while consumers (and perhaps others) are worse off as a result
of the restriction. Consider the standard example of foreclosure by a dominant firm
of its rivals by the use of exclusive dealing. As the story goes, there are only a few
distributors, there are scale economies, and the dominant firm locks up the major
distributors through exclusive dealing contracts.14 This can be thought of as the
distributors forming a coalition with the dominant firm to exclude rivals to the
dominant firm, thereby allowing the dominant firm to remain a dominant firm and
reap profits, some of which it can share with its coalition partners (the
distributors).15 Exactly how much the dominant firm has to share with the
distributors will depend on how important the marginal distributor is and that could
range from zero to a lot.16
But a moment’s thought will reveal that the harmed buyers could form a coalition
and bribe the distributors to enable entry of competing manufacturers. That of
course sounds pretty hard to do—high transaction costs of organizing lots of small
consumers into a group. But not so fast. Why can’t a distributor or potential entrant
manufacturer act on behalf of its future customers and engage in the transaction and
create competition?
We think that the best answer is that that is complicated to do because there is no
easy way (or it is too costly) to bind future consumers to purchase from the
negotiating firm. It is the difficulty of dealing with future customers that makes
transaction costs especially high in this situation. That is why exclusionary conduct
can sometimes succeed.17
Indeed, we suspect that transaction costs are an important reason for why it is
easier to exclude entrants than it is to exclude established firms with established
customer relations. Indeed, if dealing with future consumers creates high transaction
costs, then one should expect that entry deterrence will work best when the current
14 See, e.g., Tirole (1988, p. 185).
15 We have adhered to the standard story line of how exclusive dealing can create antitrust harm. A slight
modification could be to include the cooperation of a large buyer whose presence could support new
entry. Instead of sponsoring entry, the large buyer is able to obtain a low enough price so that it is
effectively sharing in the monopoly profits that are created for the incumbent, by the large buyer’s
unwillingness to purchase from a new entrant. Aghion and Bolton (1987) use a mechanism much like this
one. See also Asker and Bar-Isaac (2014), who demonstrate that vertical restraints may be a way for the
upstream monopolist to ‘‘bribe’’ its downstream distributors to cooperate in excluding a potential
upstream rival to the monopolist.
16 See Rasmusen et al. (1991), Segal and Whinston (2000).
17 It is frequently pointed out (correctly) that the entrant can expect to earn only duopoly profits, which
limits what it is willing to bid for scarce resources (such as the loyalty of customer purchases), whereas
the monopolist is trying to protect its (higher) monopoly profits (perhaps enhanced by the use of nonlinear
pricing) and is thereby willing to bid higher for the scarce resources. But, again, this reverts to the
transactions cost of the entrant’s efforts to capture the consumer surplus that it creates when it enters.
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product is durable and sold (not rented),18 when there are scale economies, and
when the future consumption of any individual consumer is uncertain. In those
circumstances, the transaction cost of guaranteeing a profitable entry may become
high, and therefore exclusionary conduct can successfully deter entry.
4.2 The Firm as a Negotiating Agent for a Collective of Buyers: Credit Cards
The previous example alluded to the possibility that a firm could act as a collective
bargaining agent for its customers. That means that a firm can be a way for what
would otherwise be an illegal collective of buyers to form and negotiate prices on
behalf of its ‘‘customers’’ and perhaps harm either suppliers or other consumer
groups. Let us give an example that comes from the literature on two-sided markets:
credit cards.
Suppose all the rich buyers in the United States band together to form the ‘‘rich
buying club.’’ The club goes to all the major stores and says that its members will
boycott any store that fails to recognize the club. Furthermore, whenever any
member of the club buys something, the retail store is required to make a small
payment—say 1 % of the purchase price—to the club. The club then keeps some of
the money for itself and gives some to its club members.
Suppose further that the club imposes a requirement on any store that recognizes
the club that the store must charge club members and non-club members the exact
same retail price. Without that restriction, the 1 % club fee would likely be passed
along at least in part to club members at the point of sale in terms of an elevated
retail price. With the price restriction in place, the store must recover any increased
costs of dealing with club members from all of its customers—a form of average
cost pricing. Another way to view what has happened as a result of the operation of
the club with its restrictions is that the members of the ‘‘rich buying club’’ have
forced the stores to place a ‘‘tax’’ on club and non-club buyers and to send that tax
revenue to the club, which then distributes some of the tax revenue to its members
and keeps the remainder for itself.
Our description in this example is reasonably close to how a credit card company,
such as Visa or MasterCard, functions: The rewards to card holders are analogous in
our example to the return of some of the 1 % fee to the club members, with the
buyers who use debit or cash being analogous to the non-club members.
We do not want to get into a debate as to whether this behavior on the part of the
credit card companies can be justified on the basis of the benefits that the card
company creates for the firms that accept its card.19 Our main point is that calling
something a ‘‘firm’’ should not immunize its actions from antitrust scrutiny if the
18 Selling a durable good is the equivalent of locking up a consumer’s consumption today and into the
future.
19 There is an enormous literature now on this topic pro and con. There have been massive amounts of
litigation in the US and in many foreign countries with regard to credit cards. Carlton has worked for
Discover and also for plaintiffs (including government agencies) that are adverse to credit card
companies. Keating has worked for major credit card companies. Because of numerous actions by
regulatory and antitrust authorities, including the settlements of private litigation, the features of our
example may no longer apply to credit cards in certain parts of the world.
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effect of those actions is the equivalent of the formation of a coalition of agents with
market power that have the ability to place a monopoly tax on others.20 Firms can be
viewed as a low-transaction cost way of organizing buyers to advantage themselves
at the expense of other buyers.
4.3 Standard-Setting Organizations
One of the clearest examples of viewing antitrust through the lens of formation of
coalitions is to focus on standard-setting organizations (SSOs). An SSO is an
institution, the express purpose of which is to allow the formation of coalitions that
agree upon and promulgate standards. A typical SSO can consist of industry
members that include both creators of intellectual property and users of intellectual
property. The SSO, for example, can define the characteristics that every
smartphone must meet in order to be ‘‘standard compliant.’’ Failure to be ‘‘standard
compliant’’ can mean zero sales.
The owner of a patent, the functionality of which is incorporated in the standard,
is said to have a ‘‘standard essential patent’’ (SEP). The incorporation of patented
functionality into a standard may confer additional market power on the owner of
the SEP when (prior to the setting of the standard) there were competing producer/
owners of similar functionalities, any one of which may have sufficed to create a
useful alternative standard. Once the standard is set, each manufacturer of a standard
compliant product must pay a royalty to the patent owner or be subject to a patent
infringement suit.
The owner of a SEP does not typically commit ex ante to any particular royalty
rate for its patent when used pursuant to the standard. The obvious antitrust concern
is that the owner of the SEP can demand high royalties because its patent has been
incorporated into a standard (and there is ‘‘lock-in’’: the ex post transaction costs of
substituting one of the ex-ante similar functionalities are relatively high).
To address this antitrust concern, SSOs typically require their members to agree
to charge fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND) rates. There has been
significant litigation about what these terms mean; but the main point that we wish
to emphasize here is that this is a problem of coalition formation.
For a patented feature to be voted into a standard, the SSO must reach some
consensus among current members to include it. Let’s suppose that there are two
substitutable patents either of which could, ex ante, be included in the standard to
produce equally valuable standards. Suppose the existing manufacturers go to
inventor 1 and say ‘‘we will vote you as the standard, provided you charge us a low
royalty. Moreover, for later entrants who will compete against us, you must charge
them a high royalty rate. In other words, we will grant you market power that you
can exploit against our future (currently non-voting) rivals and consumers, and by
charging us a low rate you will be sharing some of those profits with us.’’
The key point to notice is that if future rivals are not members of the SSO or not
important members, this is a way in which it is easy to form a coalition to raise
20 Similar concerns can arise for, e.g., insurance companies that can act as negotiating agents for many
policy holders.
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rivals’ costs. Even if there is no explicit agreement about what the ex ante royalty
rate will be, so long as it is understood that the royalty rate will be higher for later
entrants, this arrangement can succeed in allowing a consortium of manufacturers
and a patent holder to exploit future consumers (that likely also are not well-
represented in the SSO).
It is possible to prevent this type of antitrust problem by interpreting the ‘‘ND’’
(non-discriminatory) part of FRAND in a particular way: If ‘‘ND’’ is interpreted to
mean that all manufacturers should be treated similarly if they are ‘‘similar,’’ then—
so long as one interprets current and subsequent entrants to be ‘‘similarly
situated’’—this particular exercise of market power is avoided.21
The beauty of the example of the standard-setting organization is that it starkly
shows that coalitions are needed both to pass the standard and to exploit others. The
exploiting coalition can consist of manufacturers, holders of intellectual property,
and some consumers, while the victims of the exploitation can be future entrants and
some consumers.
5 Conclusion
In a world of no transaction costs, the usual justifications for antitrust policy as a
way to avoid the inefficiencies from market power disappear. In the more realistic
setting of transaction costs, an antitrust analysis must pay attention to whether
nonlinear pricing is used and, if so, how its use alters the antitrust analysis from the
usual one that assumes uniform pricing.
Industry practices and market structure can affect the ability to use nonlinear
pricing. When that ability is present, it can be misleading to ignore that ability and
to act as if there is uniform pricing. Especially when mergers generate large
production efficiencies and when the merged firm can move from uniform pricing to
nonlinear pricing, the standard analysis can give the wrong answer about whether a
particular merger is desirable.
More generally, when one examines those situations where the cost of forming
coalitions is high or low, one can gain insight into when market power is likely to
occur. By focusing on coalitions that include more than just firms, one can gain
some insight into understanding conduct that has raised antitrust concerns in
exclusive dealing, credit cards, and standard setting organizations.
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